


MILITARY JUSTICE UPDATE
COLONEL (RETIRED) RICHARD D. ROSEN

# LEAD SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL

- (a) The lead special trial counsel is a judge advocate in a grade no lower than O-7 (brigadier general or rear admiral lower half).
- (b) The lead special prosecutor reports directly to the service secretary "without intervening authority."
- (c) Special trial counsel assigned to the office of the lead special trial counsel must be independent of the commands of both the alleged victim and the accused.




## NAVY LEAD SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL



Rear Admiral
Jonathan T.
Stephens

## MARINE CORPS LEAD SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL





#### OFFICE OF SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL

Brigadier General Kevin S. Woodard serves as the Lead Special Trial Counsel of the U.S. Marine Corps....

#### OFFICE OF SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL

Colonel Terrance J. Reese serves as the Deputy Lead Special Trial Counsel of the U.S. Marine Corps. ...

## AIR FORCE/SPACE FORCE LEAD SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL



Brigadier General Christopher A. Brown

## **COAST GUARD CHIEF PROSECUTOR**



## Rear Admiral William (Bill) G. Dwyer

Chief Prosecutor of the Coast Guard



MILITARY JUSTICE UPDATE
COLONEL (RETIRED) RICHARD D. ROSEN



**Brigadier General Warren Wells** 

In 2013, in his role as a regional military defense counsel, then-LTC Wells emailed his staff:

- **©** "Expect no commander to be able to make objective decisions involving [sexual assault] allegations as long [as] Congress and our political masters are dancing by the fire of misleading statistics and one-sided, repetitive misinformation by those with an agenda."
- "[H]opefully a Soldier will be able to get a fair trial. You and your teams are now the ONLY line of defense against false allegations and sobriety regret. You literally are the personal defenders of those no one will now defend, even when all signs indicate innocence."



**Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth** 



Removed "based on a loss of trust and confidence+

"The lead special trial counsel position was created to take cases out of the chain of command in order to remove bias from the process of justice for survivors. That the military's pick to fill this role has clear bias against victims is beyond alarming.... This news raises concerns as to systemic issues that perpetuate a broken decision-making process allowing Wells to be elevated to this position to address the sexual assault crisis."

— Josh Connolly, Lead Special Prosecutor Fired Following Emails Reavled Disparaging Survivors' Assault Allegations, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS NEWS BLOG (Dec. 7, 2023)

Wells' "email was the essence of leadership. Wells exhorted defense counsel to do their job and remain independent from outside influence. Service members deserve nothing less from appointed defense counsel. What American would want otherwise? [By] firing Wells, the Secretary of the Army endangers the professional ethos that is the cornerstone of our armed forces. Political commissars operating in Joseph Stalin's Russia or implementing Vladimir Putin's personal desires would understand her desire to control independent thinking and professional practice among sworn public servants."

— Michael Newton, The Army's First Ever Lead Special Trial Counsel Just Got Fired for Behaving Ethically, THE HILL (Dec. 27, 2023)

"The irony is that Wells's removal vindicates his caution from a decade ago to his subordinate attorneys, that they should perform their duties in the face of criticism by 'those with an agenda.' [The] ethical calling of defense attorneys is to zealously represent their clients. Secretary Wormuth has signaled that compliance with professional and ethical duties is insufficient."

— Michael Newton, The Army's First Ever Lead Special Trial Counsel Just Got Fired for Behaving Ethically, THE HILL (Dec. 27, 2023)

"Wormuth's decision to fire Wells raises serious concerns about the future of defense counsel and the integrity of the military justice system. This is not just about one email or one person; it represents a concern that shifts towards a system where challenging the status quo or questioning narratives can come at the cost of one's career. [There] will undoubtedly be litigation related to the firing. It is uncertain whether litigation will cause cases to be dismissed. Over the next few months, we will start to see defense counsel filing motions and requests for action to discover essential information about the firing, examine the possibility of unlawful influences, and seek dismissal of charges. Should that happen, no one really wins, long or short term, and there will be a shadow of doubt cast upon the integrity and independence of the military justice system."

— Philip Cave, Under a Shadow of a Doubt: Why Wormuth's Firing of Wells Threatens Defense Counsel in the Military Justice System, Law Office of Law & Military Justice, Jan. 13, 2024



MILITARY JUSTICE UPDATE
COLONEL (RETIRED) RICHARD D. ROSEN

### SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL AUTHORITY

A special trial counsel has the exclusive authority to determine if a reported offense is a covered offense. MCM, 2024, RCM 303A(a). If a special trial counsel determines that a reported offense is a covered offense or receives a preferred charge alleging a covered offense(s):

- (a) Covered offenses. The special trial counsel *must* exercise exclusive authority over the covered offense(s). UCMJ art. 24(c)(1)(A); MCM, 2014, RCM 303A(b).
- (b) Related offenses. The special trial counsel *may also* exercise authority over related offenses, UCMJ art. 24(c)(1)(B); MCM, 2014, RCM 303A(b), and .
- (c) Known offenses. The special trial counsel *may also* exercise authority over any offense or charge alleged to have been committed by the suspect of the covered offense. UCMJ art. 24(c)(1)(B); MCM, 2024, RCM 303A(c).
- (d) Offenses committed before the effective date of the act. The special trial counsel *may* exercise sole and exclusive authority over certain covered offenses, as well as related and known offenses committed before December 27, 2023. UCMJ art. 24(d)

#### SENTENCING REFORM: SENTENCING AUTHORITY

- (a) Non-Capital Cases. If the accused is convicted in a trial by special or general court-martial, military judges (not members) sentence the accused. UCMJ art. 53(b)(1).
- (b) Capital Cases. Members shall determine (i) whether the sentence for that offense shall be death or life in prison without eligibility for parole; or (ii) whether the matter shall be returned to the military judge for determination of a lesser punishment; and the military judge shall sentence the accused for that offense, UCMJ art. 53(c)(1)(A)

### SENTENCING REFORM: SENTENCING DETERMINATION

- (a) Offenses Subject to Sentencing Parameters. For each offense, the military judge must sentence the accused within the applicable parameter, unless the military judge finds specific facts warranting a sentence outside the parameter. If so, the military judge must include in the record a written statement of the factual basis for the sentence. UCMJ art. 56(c)(2); MCM, 2024, RCM 1002(a)(2)(B).
- (b) Offenses Subject to Sentencing Criteria. The military judge must consider the applicable sentencing criteria in determining the sentence. UCMJ art. 56(c)(3); MCM 2024, RCM 1002(a)(2)(A).

### SENTENCING REFORM: PLEA AGREEMENTS

The military judge of a general or special court-martial shall accept a plea agreement submitted by the parties, except that:

- (1) For offenses with a sentencing parameters, the military judge may reject a plea agreement that proposes a sentence that is outside the sentencing parameter if the military judge determines that the proposed sentence is plainly unreasonable. UCMJ art. 53a(b)(1), MCM, 2024, RCM 1002(a)(3)(A).
- (2) For offenses without sentencing parameters, the military judge may reject a plea agreement that proposes a sentence if the military judge determines that the proposed sentence is plainly unreasonable. UCMJ art. 53a(b)(2), MCM, 2024, RCM 1002(a)(3)(B)

#### COURTS OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (CCAS): APPELLATE REVIEW

- (1) Factual Sufficiency. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act limited the power of the CCAs to review and modify factual findings of a court-martial. Last month, in *United States v. Harvey*, --- M.J. ---, 2024 WL 4128457 (C.A.A.F., Sep. 6, 2024), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) defined, in part, the nature of the review to be undertaken by the CCAs.
  - > See United States v. Whisenhunt, 2019 WL 2368568 (A.C.C.A. 2019) (case motivating, at least in part, Congress' modification of the CCA's authority to review factual findings. The court overturned a rape conviction at the U.S. Military Academy based upon factual insufficiency.)
- (2) Sentencing Review. In *United States v. Flores*, 84 M.J. 277 (C.A.A.F. 2024), CAAF interpreted pre-sentencing reform appellate review of offense-based sentencing. The case seemingly applies to the post-reform provisions.

#### DIRECT SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL

(1) Current Statutes.

UCMJ 867a(a), 10 U.S.C. § 867a(a): "Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces are subject to review by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari as provided in 28 [U.S.C. § 1259]. The Supreme Court may not review by a writ of certiorari under this section any action of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in refusing to grant a petition for review."

28 U.S.C. § 1259: Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ["CAAF"] may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in the following cases: (1) Cases reviewed by CAAF under UCMJ art. 67(a)(1); (2) Cases certified to the CAAF by the Judge Advocate General under UCMJ art. 67(a)(2); (3) Cases in which CAAF granted a petition for review under section UCMJ art. 67(a)(3); (4) Other cases in which the CAAF granted relief

#### **DIRECT SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL**

(1) Amended Statutes (effective 24 Dec 2024).

UCMJ 867a(a), 10 U.S.C. § 867a(a): "Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces are subject to review by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari as provided in 28 [U.S.C. § 1259]."

28 U.S.C. § 1259: Decisions of CAAF may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in the following cases: .... (3) Cases in which CAAF granted *or refused to grant* a petition for review under section UCMJ art. 67(a)(3); (4) Other cases in which the CAAF granted *or refused to grant* relief.



MILITARY JUSTICE UPDATE
COLONEL (RETIRED) RICHARD D. ROSEN

## RULE FOR COURT-MARTIAL (RCM) 914(A)—"JENCKS ACT"

(1) United States v. Palik, 84 M.J. 284 (C.A.A.F. 2024): Defense counsel deemed ineffective because they failed failed to make a motion under RCM 914(a) for prior statements of the complaining witness purportedly recorded and negligently lost by Air Force OSI. Under CAAF precedent, government negligence did not serve as an excuse for the loss of the recordings. If the government failed to comply with an order to deliver, under RCM 914(e) the military judge would have had to "strike" the witness' testimony or declare a mistrial.

#### (2) In 2023, the President amended RCM 914:


"In the event that the other party cannot comply with this rule because the statement is lost, and can prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the loss of the witness statement was not attributable to bad faith or gross negligence, the military judge may exercise the sanctions set forth in paragraph (e)(1) of this rule only if—(A) the statement is of such central importance to an issue that it is essential to a fair trial, and (B) there is no adequate substitute for the statement."



MILITARY JUSTICE UPDATE
COLONEL (RETIRED) RICHARD D. ROSEN










24th Infantry Regiment (1867-1951)



24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, Camp Walker, Philippine Islands 1902



24th Infantry Regiment, Cuba, 1898



24th Infantry Regiment, Mexican Expedition, 1917



MILITARY JUSTICE UPDATE
COLONEL (RETIRED) RICHARD D. ROSEN

#### HOME THE HOUSTON PRESS I CENT

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THE DEAD

"Lock Me Up.

#### The Houston Chronicle Home Edition

#### 17 KILLED; 21 ARE INJURED IN WILD NIGHT

Washington, Aug. 24. Security Support of ... on to my being to point of social loss is you put? today, arrowmend that the negro broops concerned. the rising at Hustin would be withdrawn and total to study

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Negro Soldier in Custody

there Santa Areas DEAD, 17. Murderous Riot Replaces Negro Watermelon Party Management of the Transplant Industry In the New York of Military Discipline

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
THY AND COUNTY UNDER MAINTAL SUNTISE Shootings Next in Order GRAH CAPTAIN MATTER OF ELIMOIS TOWANDS AN ARTOMOLIERE TO RELP WITH REGISTAN AND THE OFFICE STATES OF STAT

#### Admits Participation: Plans Are Forming for Says Henry Ringleader Speedy Courtmartial, Capt. Snow Announces



**Fort Sam Houston Post Chapel** 


Harry S. Grier Infantry Officer Defense Counsel\*





118 accused 3 courts-martial

\*No investigative support Less than two weeks to prepare for trial



United States v. Nesbit, et al.: 63 accused

#### United States v. Nesbit, et al.

23 Aug 1917: Riot in downtown Houston.

25 Aug 1917: Most of battalion sent to Columbus, NM.

Aug-Nov 1917: Regimental Board of Investigation + investigations by Southern Department's and Army IGs.

1 Nov 1917: Court-martial commenced.


30 Nov 1917: Trial completed.

2 Dec 1917: Court members deliver findings and sentence 13 men sentenced to death. Convening authority orders verdicts and sentences not be made public. SJA reviewed findings & sentences.

10 Dec 1917: Convening authority approves findings and sentences; orders sentences to be immediately executed.

11 Dec 1917: 13 condemned men hanged together and buried in unmarked graves.

The War department did not learn of the trial until after the executions were carried out.



SJA, Southern Department



MG John W. Rickman Commander, Southern Department

### SENTENCING REFORM: PLEA AGREEMENTS

[C]onfirmation by the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-martial is carried into execution, namely: ... (d) Any sentence of death, except in the cases of persons convicted in time of war of murder [or] mutiny ..., and in such excepted cases a sentence of death may be carried into execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the field or by the commanding general of the Territorial department or division."

— Art. 48, Articles of War of 1916, 39 Stat. 558

War Dep't, Gen. Order 169 (Dec. 29, 1917): requiring all sentences of death be sent to the Judge Advocate General for review.

# THIRTEEN NEGROES HANGED IN TEXAS

FOUND GUILTY OF COMPLICITY
IN THE RIOT AND MUTINY AT HOUSTON.

### FORTY-ONE SENTENCED FOR LIFE

Only the Army Officers and Sheriff Were Present—Execution Was Kept Secret.

San Antonio, Texas, Dec. 11.—Thirteen megroes of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, found guilty of complicity in the riot and mutiny at Houston on August 23, were hanged this morning.


Only the army officers and sheriff were present. The execution was kept secret until nine o'clock.


Of the sixty-three tried by court martial, forty-one were sentenced to life imprisonment.





In this plot of Ground are buried 18 members of the 24th U.S. Infantry Hansed near this site for mutiny at Houston Texas Aug. 23th 1917






BG Samuel T. Ansell, Acting TJAG 1917-1918



MG Enoch H. Crowder TJAG 1911-1923







LTG William Benjamin Kean, Jr. Commanded 25 Infantry Division 1948-1951


24th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, Korea 1950



1-24th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division







residents, Houston police, and fellow military personnel under the oppressive Jim Crow system;

WHEREAS, Tensions culminated in the Camp Logan Riot on August 23, 1917, sparked by the mistreatment of a Black soldier and a subsequent violent confrontation, resulting in tragic loss of life; and

WHEREAS, The subsequent court martial of 118 soldiers, conducted by all-White panels without adequate legal representation, led to convictions and harsh sentences, including death for many, in a grave miscarriage of justice; and

WHEREAS, Recognizing the injustice, the Houston NAACP Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Committee, in collaboration South Texas College of Law Houston, STCL Houston professors Dru Brenner-Beck, Geoffrey Corn, and Catherine Greene Burnett, STCL Houston law students, and various other organizations, tirelessly pursued clemency for the wrongfully convicted soldiers;

WHEREAS, On November 13, 2023, the Honorable Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, granted clemency to the 110 African American soldiers, affirming that it is never too late to rectify past wrongs; and

WHEREAS, Let it be known that we acknowledge the sacrifices and injustices endured by the soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment. The City of Houston honors their memory and legacy as we strive for equality and justice for all.

THEREFORE, I, John Whitmire, Mayor of the City of Houston, hereby proclaim February 20,

#### 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment Day

in Houston, Texas.



In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and have caused the Official Seal of the City of Houston to be affixed this 15th day of February, 2024.

Mayor of the City of Houston



### DIGITAL DISRESPECT: UNITED STATES V. BROWN

Assigned to the Coast Guard Cutter *Polar Star*, Brown sent three disrespectful texts to a group created by the senior chief petty officer to pass along work-related information to the ship's petty officers while the cutter was in dry dock:

- (1) The first petty officer received a disrespectful text sent by Brown while the petty officer was with the cutter in dry dock.
- (2) The second petty officer received a disrespectful text Brown sent outside of normal duty hours.
- (3) The third petty officer received a disrespectful text Brown sent while she was on while convalescent leave.

CAAF overturned the accused's conviction for the second and third texts because the government failed to show that either petty officer was in the execution of her duties when the disrespectful texts were sent.



### VICTIM'S RIGHTS: PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE & ABATEMENT OF COURT MARTIAL-PROCEEDINGS

UCMJ art. 6b(e)(1): "If the victim of an offense under this chapter believes that a preliminary hearing ruling under section 832 of this title (article 32) or a court-martial ruling violates the rights of the victim afforded by a section (article) or rule specified in paragraph (4), the victim may petition the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus to require the preliminary hearing officer or the court-martial to comply with the section (article) or rule."

UCMJ art. 6b(e)(4): Paragraph (1) applies with respect to the protections afforded by the following ... (D) Military Rule of Evidence 513, relating to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

### VICTIM'S RIGHTS: PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE & ABATEMENT OF COURT MARTIAL-PROCEEDINGS

### Victim sought mandamus to:

- (1) Seal or destroy the mental heal records. Military judge already ordered the records sealed.
- (2) Lift the abatement order. UCMJ article 6b(4)(D) does not give the victim standing to challenge the military judge' abatement order. The abatement order neither violated the privilege afforded by Military Rule of Evidence 513(a). "The abatement order served only to stop the court-martial proceedings; it did not vitiate her privilege or require her to waive the privilege."



## ARTICLE 134 PREEMPTION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: United States v. Grijalva, 84 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

UCMJ art. 134: "Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court...."

## ARTICLE 134 PREEMPTION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: United States v. Grijalva, 84 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

"The initial phrase of the article expressly restricts its reach only to conduct 'not specifically mentioned in this chapter.' This Court has interpreted this phrase as prohibiting the charging of conduct as an offense under Article 134, UCMJ, if Congress has already codified the conduct as an offense in Articles 80 through 132, UCMJ...."

— Grijalva 84 M.J. at 435 (citing U.S. v. Avery, 79 M.J. 363, 366 (C.A.A.F. 2020))

### ARTICLE 134 PREEMPTION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: UNITED STATES V. GRIJALVA, 84 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

"The act of distributing nonobscene visual images is a form of speech." Therefore, the court considered the relationship between the First Amendment's protection of speech and the conduct alleged in the specification.

— *Grijalva* 84 M.J. at 436 (quoting *New York v. Ferber*, 458 U.S. 747, 764-765 (1982))

### ARTICLE 134 PREEMPTION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: UNITED STATES V. GRIJALVA, 84 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

"While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections."

— Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974)

CAAF has "narrowed the very broad reach of the literal language' of the first clause of Article 134, UCMJ, such that it <u>only</u> applies to conduct that is 'directly and palpably—as distinguished from indirectly and remotely—prejudicial to good order and discipline.'"

— Grijalva 84 M.J. at 436 (quoting Parker, 417 U.S. at 753-754))

## ARTICLE 134 PREEMPTION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: United States v. Grijalva, 84 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

Accused charged under Article 134 with broadcasting intimate visual images of another, "an act which is of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."

Issue: Whether the specification is preempted by UCMJ art. 117a, which deals with accused who broadcast intimate images and "whose conduct ... had a reasonably direct and palpable connection to a military mission or military environment." Is the offense charged composed of a residuum of the elements of the specific offense?

## ARTICLE 134 PREEMPTION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: United States v. Grijalva, 84 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

The reach of the first clause of Article 134—all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces—is subject to the delimiting interpretation the court has placed on the clause. That is, in a First Amendment challenge to the specification the government that the accused conduct had a reasonably direct and palpable connection to a military mission or military environment—the same "terminal" element under UCMJ article 117a.

— *Grijalva* 84 M.J. at 438-439



### ARTICLE 134 PREEMPTION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: United States v. Smith, -- M.J. --, 2024 WL 4206794 (C.A.A.F., Sep. 13, 2024)

- (1) CAAF limited the categories of unprotected speech to those specified by the Supreme Court: CAAF identified the "historic and traditional categories" of unprotected speech: "(1) incitement to imminent lawless action; (2) obscenity; (3) defamation; (4) speech integral to criminal conduct; (5) fighting words; (6) child pornography; (7) fraud; (8) true threats; and (9) speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the Government has the power to prevent." The court held that "[i]f a content-based restriction on speech does not fall within one of these historically recognized categories, the restriction is presumed to be unconstitutional." It rejected the Air Force court's balancing test (whether the speech was "an essential part of any exposition of ideas").
- (2) CAAF held that it will apply the same First Amendment law that applies in civilian courts where the speech occurs in a civilian setting, while the accused is wearing civilian clothes and without any visible indications of the accused's military status.



### CAAF DECIDES UNITED STATES V. HASAN

United States v. Hasan, 84 M.J. 181 (C.A.A.F. 2024), pet. for cert. filed, No. 24-5225 (U.S., Aug. 5, 2024)



#### CAAF DECIDES UNITED STATES V. HASAN

United States v. Hasan, 84 M.J. 181 (C.A.A.F. 2024), pet. for cert. filed, No. 24-5225 (U.S., Aug. 5, 2024)

No.

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NIDAL M. HASAN, Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES, Respondent.

APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

To the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States:

Petitioner, Major Nidal M. Hasan, U.S. Army, a soldier court-martialed at Fort Hood, Texas, respectfully requests an enlargement of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including August 1, 2024. The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ("CAAF") that denied in part and granted in part the petition for reconsideration, was entered on March 4, 2024. Petitioner's time to petition for certiorari in this Court expires June 2, 2024. This application is being filed more than 10 days before that date.

Copies of the majority opinion in the CAAF are attached hereto. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1259(1). See also 10 U.S.C. § 867a(1).

This is a capital case with important questions that could affect service members across the world. Thus, counsel requires additional time to craft the petition in this case because the undersigned counsel have limited experience drafting and filing petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. The sixty-day extension is also necessary because the undersigned counsel are the equivalent of public appellate defense counsel in a jurisdiction where all

soldiers convicted at court-martial enjoy an appeal as a matter of right. Counsel are operating with limited resources and a large caseload. Thus, the undersigned counsel request the additional time to perform the necessary legal research and drafting so that the questions raised by the lower court's decision can be properly framed and presented to this Court.

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that an order be entered extending his time to petition for certiorari to and including August 1, 2024.

Respectfully submitted,

May 20, 2024

AMIR R. HAMDOUN Captain, Judge Advocate Appellate Defense Counsel, Defense Appellate Division 9275 Gunston Road Fort Belyoir, VA 22060 JONATHAN F. POTTER Counsel of Record Senior Appellate Counsel Defense Appellate Division 9275 Gunston Road Fort Belvoir, VA 22060



### **DOUBLE JEOPARDY & ARTICLE 134 OFFENSES**

United States v. Driskell, 84 M.J. 248 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

Accused charged in Italy with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1) under Article 134, clause 3, by possessing obscene cartoons. After the close of evidence, the military judge dismissed the case without prejudice finding there was no jurisdiction in Italy under the federal statute (the statute requires evidence that the paction moved in interstate commerce or was committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States). The accused was later charged with the same conduct under Article 134, clause 2. The accused moved to dismiss the specification based on Double Jeopardy under the Constitution and UCMJ article 44(a). Both the military judge denied the motion and the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed because the first specification was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

### **DOUBLE JEOPARDY & ARTICLE 134 OFFENSES**

United States v. Driskell, 84 M.J. 248 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

- (1) Jeopardy attaches to an offense when the Government introduces evidence on the general issue of guilt. UCMJ art. 44(c); RCM (07(b)(C)(i)(I); *U.S. v. Easton*, 71 M.J. 168, 172 (C.A.A.F. 2021). The parties do not dispute that this happened in the first court-martial.
- (2) CAAF agreed with "the general proposition that jeopardy cannot attach if the court-martial lacks jurisdiction because RCM 907(b)(2)(C)(iv) provides that '[n]o court-martial proceeding which lacked jurisdiction to try the accused for the offense is a trial in the sense of [the rule against double jeopardy]."

### **DOUBLE JEOPARDY & ARTICLE 134 OFFENSES**

United States v. Driskell, 84 M.J. 248 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

Issue: Whether the first court-martial lacked jurisdiction to try the accused for the offense because the government could not prove a jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1).

CAAF held that the first court-martial did **not** lack jurisdiction because (1) it had personal jurisdiction over the accused under UCMJ art. 2(a)(1) who was a member of the regular component of the armed forces, <u>and</u> (2) it had jurisdiction to determine whether the accused had violated UCMJ article 134.

"The question of whether the court-martial had personal and subject matter jurisdiction is distinct from the merits question of whether the Government alleged and proved a fact necessary to show a violation of [18 U.S.C.] § 1466A, namely, that the alleged conduct occurred in a location to which the statute applies."



### PRESENTENCING PROCEDURE: PRESENTATION BY THE VICTIM

United States v. Harrington, 83 M.J. 408 (C.A.A.F. 2023)

"Once again, this Court is presented with the question whether a novel approach toward the delivery of a victim's unsworn statement exceeds what the President has authorized under R.C.M. 1001(c)(5), and again we conclude that it does. Presentation of the 'unsworn statement via a question-andanswer format with trial counsel violates the Rules for Courts-Martial because it contravenes the principle that an unsworn victim statement belongs solely to the victim or the victim's designee [not the government]."

### PRESENTENCING PROCEDURE: PRESENTATION BY THE VICTIM

United States v. Hamilton, 78 M.J. 335, 342 (C.A.A.F. 2019)

The victim statement "is not a mechanism whereby the government may slip in evidence in aggravation that would otherwise be prohibited by the Military Rules of Evidence, or information that does not relate to the impact of the offense for which the accused in convicted."

#### PRESENTENCING PROCEDURE: PRESENTATION BY THE VICTIM

United States v. Edwards, 82 M.J. 239, 241 (C.A.A.F. 2022)

The trial counsel may not produce a video of the victim's unsworn statement and on behalf of the victim's family.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hqlaMdNgcc



### CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDGE-ALONE SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL

United States v. Wheeler, --- M.J. ---, 2024 WL 3932500 (C.A.A.F., Aug. 22, 2024)

District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 662 (1937): "[T]he right of trial by jury, thus secured, does not extend to every criminal proceeding. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution there were numerous offenses, commonly described as 'petty,' which were tried summarily without a jury, by justices of the peace in England, and by police magistrates or corresponding judicial officers in the Colonies, and punished by commitment to jail, a workhouse, or a house of correction."

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970): "[A] possible six-month penalty is short enough to permit classification of the offense as 'petty' ...." See also Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (presumption that a maximum jail sentence of six months or less is a petty offense); Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 328 (1996) ("it is now settled that a legislature's determination that an offense carries maximum prison term of six months or less indicates its view that an offense is 'petty."").



### CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDGE-ALONE SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL

United States v. Moore, 84 M.J. 695 (N.M.C.C.A. 2024)

"An affirmative defense to a charged offense would, by definition, constitute matter inconsistent with a plea of guilty and a military judge must resolve the apparent inconsistency or reject the plea.... [I]f a party sets up matter raising a possible defense, then the military judge is required to make further inquiry and resolve any apparent ambiguity or inconsistency."

