

Space Law, AI, and Cybersecurity

Protecting the Security and Sustainability of the Next Frontier

Texas Bar Computer and Technology Section

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NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Framework Launched 2014

Updated 2018





NIST Cybersecurity Framework

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Core

Before a Cyber Attack or Intrusion

Profiles Tiers





NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Functions, Categories, Sub-Categories, Informative References

Before a Cyber Attack or Intrusion

NIST Cybersecurity Framework - Core





Before a Cyber Attack or Intrusion

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

NIST Cybersecurity Framework – Core | Functions

Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover





Before a Cyber Attack or Intrusion

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

- NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core | Categories
- Subsets of Functions (Asset Management, Risk Assessment)





| Table | 1: | Function | a |
|-------|----|----------|---|
|-------|----|----------|---|

| Function Unique Identifier | Function | Category Unique Identifier | Category |
|----------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|---|
| ID | ID Identify | | Asset Management |
| | | ID.BE | Business Environment |
| | | ID.GV | Governance |
| | | ID.RA | Risk Assessment |
| | | ID.RM | Risk Management Strategy |
| | | ID.SC | Supply Chain Risk Management |
| PR | Protect | PR.AC | Identity Management and Access Control |
| | | PR.AT | Awareness and Training |
| | | PR.DS | Data Security |
| | | PR.IP | Information Protection Processes and Procedures |
| | | PR.MA | Maintenance |
| | | PR.PT | Protective Technology |
| DE | Detect | DE.AE | Anomalies and Events |
| | | | Security Continuous Monitoring |
| 5 25 | | DE.DP | Detection Processes |
| RS | Respond | RS.RP | Response Planning |
| | | RS.CO | Communications |
| | | RS.AN | Analysis |
| | | RS.MI | Mitigation |
| | | RS.IM | Improvements |
| RC | Recover | RC.RP | Recovery Planning |
| | | RC.IM | Improvements |
| | | RC.CO | Communications |



and Category Unique Identifiers



Before a Cyber Attack or Intrusion

Subsets of Categories (detection notifications investigated)

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

NIST Cybersecurity Framework – Core | Sub-Categories





Before a Cyber Attack or Intrusion

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

NIST Cybersecurity Framework – Core | References

Resources to Guide Sub-Categories





| Function | Category | Subcategory | Informative References |
|------------------|--|--|---|
| IDENTIFY (ID) | IDENTIFY (D) Asset Management (ID.AM): The data, personnel, devices, systems, and facilities that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to organizational objectives and the organization's risk strategy. | ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems within the organization are inventoried | CIS CSC 1 COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5 |
| | | ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried | CIS CSC 2 COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02, BAI09.05 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2, A.12.5.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5 |
| | | ID.AM-3: Organizational communication and data flows are mapped | CIS CSC 12 COBIT 5 DSS05.02 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, CA-3, CA-9, PL-8 |
| | | ID.AM-4: External information systems are catalogued | CIS CSC 12 COBIT 5 APO02.02, APO10.04, DSS01.02 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.6 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-20, SA-9 |
| | ID.AM-5: Resources (e.g., hardware, devices, data, time, personnel, and software) are prioritized based on their classification, criticality, and business value | CIS CSC 13, 14 COBIT 5 APO03.03, APO03.04, APO12.01, BAI04.02, BAI09.02 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.6 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, RA-2, SA-14, SC-6 | |
| | ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the entire workforce and | CIS CSC 17, 19 COBIT 5 APO01.02, APO07.06, APO13.01, DSS06.03 | |

Table 2: Framework Core





| CYL INF SEC | BERSECURITY & FRASTRUCTURE CORITY AGENCY | CYBER DEFENSE AGENCY | | |
|-------------------|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| Top | nics - Spotlight Resources & Tools - Ne me / <u>Resources & Tools</u> / <u>Groups</u> | ews & Events 🗸 Careers 🗸 About 🖌 | REPORT A CYBER ISSUE SHARE: (?) (?) in (2) | |
| | Resources & Tools All Resources & Tools Services Programs Resources Training Groups | Ace Systems Critical In king Group | ofrastructure | |
| Top | t <u>urn to top</u> pics Spotlight Resources & Tools News | & Events Careers About | | |
| | CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY | | OInOInOInInInCISA Central888-282-0870Central@cisa.dhs.gov∞ | |









2022 – Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act

Part of Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022

Amends Homeland Security Act





- 2022 Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act
 - Critical Infrastructure Sectors (16)
 - **Communications Sector**
- Energy | IT | Financial Services | Emergency Services | Transportation





"Communications Sector is one of the few sectors that can affect all other sectors"

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (2021)



CISA Communications Sector Broadcast | Cable | Satellite | Wireless | Wireline

CIRCIA – Reporting Requirements





- CIRCIA
- **CISA Rulemaking**
- March 2024 NPRM Target
 - Final Rule 18 Months



CIRCIA

Compliance with Final Rule

Suggest Now

report@cisa.gov or (8888) 282-0870



Earth Stations

Space Assets

Space Stations

Connection Between Stations





Businessweek

The Satellite Hack Everyone Is Finally Talking About

As Putin began his invasion of Ukraine, a network used throughout Europe—and by the Ukrainian military—faced an unprecedented cyberattack that doubled as an industrywide wake-up call.

By Katrina Manson Illustrations by Jordan Speer March 1, 2023 at 12:01 AM CST

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Cybersecurity and Space



ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

February 2022 With Information as of January 2022



Cybersecurity and Space

"We assess that China presents the broadest, most active, and persistent cyber espionage threat to U.S. Government and private sector networks. China's cyber pursuits and export of related technologies increase the threats of attacks against the U.S. homeland, suppression of U.S. web content that Beijing views as threatening to its control, and the expansion of technology-driven authoritarianism globally."

China



"We assess that Russia will remain a top cyber threat as it refines and employs its espionage, influence, and attack capabilities. We assess that Russia views cyber disruptions as a foreign policy lever to shape other countries' decisions, as well as a deterrence and military tool."

Cybersecurity and Space

Russia



Cybersecurity and Space

Iran

"Iran's growing expertise and willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations make it a major threat to the security of U.S. and allied networks and data."



North Korea

"North Korea's cyber program poses a sophisticated and agile espionage, cybercrime, and attack threat. Pyongyang is well positioned to conduct surprise cyber attacks given its stealth and history of bold action."

Cybersecurity and Space



Types of Attacks

- Spoofing | Interception | Corruption | Tampering
 - Denial of Service | Brute-Force
- Signal Hijacking | SSA Deception | Seizure of Control
 - Jamming | Solar Storms



Review trust relationships

Secure methods for authentication (MFA)

Enforce principle of least privilege





- Encryption
- **Ensure Robust Patching and System Configuration Audits**
 - Monitor at Ingress and Egress Points (logs)
- Ensure Incident Response, Resilience, and Continuity of Operations





- Assess:
- Presence of Insecure Remote Access Tools (Telnet, ftp, SSH, SCP, VNC)
- Network Traffic from SATCOM networks to other networks





- Assess:
- Unauthorized use of local or backup accounts within SATCOM
 - Unexpected terminal to terminal traffic
 - Brute force login attempts



Where to Begin?

Passwords and Password Policy

MFA





- Where to Begin?
 - **Read Materials**
- NIST, CISA, Space Sector Specific
 - **Monitor Developments**





DOC – NOAA - CRSRA Final Rules – May 19, 2020

Cybersecurity

(eg tracking, telemetry, and control) encryption



DOC – NOAA - CRSRA Final Rules – May 19, 2020

Cybersecurity

recommend taking higher level, provide for encryption of data where possible



DOC – NOAA - CRSRA Final Rules – May 19, 2020

Cybersecurity

Recommendations Provided (Requirements less stringent that had been proposed)



Where to Begin?

Identify Asset Vulnerabilities

Identify Vulnerabilities





KNOW YOUR PARTNERS

YOU HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO KNOW YOUR CUSTOMERS AND PARTNERS

This essentially means that you should understand the nuances of any company with whom you work.



- Where to Begin?
- Allow Only Authorized Devices to Communicate with Satellites Authenticate Device
 - **Drop All Unconfirmed Communications**
 - **Check Integrity of Communications**



- Where to Begin?
- Scale Up: Allow Only Authorized Devices to Access Sensitive Data
 - Encryption
 - Authenticated Before Decryption
 - **But Encryption All Around**



- Where to Begin?
- Make Satellites Resilient to Adverse Conditions
 - Solid Protocols
 - Alternate or Secondary Communications Channel
 - When down, store data and send afterwards





- Where to Begin?
- **Build Protections Into Satellite**
 - Thwart DDOS and Other Attacks
- Protect Vehicle if Communications Compromised
- Enhance Ability to Ingest and Share Threat Data





Compliance by Design



- Design
- Secure Device Design and Development
 - Hardware, Firmware, OS, and Apps
 - Redundancy





- Design
- Hardware Root of Trust and Secure Boot
- Provide Update, Upgrade, and Uninstall Capabilities
 - Avoid Known Security Weaknesses
 - Prevent Unauthorized Software from Executing





- Design
 - Log
- Investigate
 - Prevent
 - Recover





Does Al pose a threat to cybersecurity?



Al can be both a threat and a useful tool for cybersecurity. On one hand, malicious actors can 📋 🖒 🖓 use AI to launch more sophisticated and targeted attacks. For example, AI can be used to automate phishing attacks, create convincing deepfake videos, or generate malware that can evade detection by traditional security systems.

On the other hand, AI can also be used to enhance cybersecurity defenses. Machine learning algorithms can be used to analyze vast amounts of data and identify patterns that may indicate a potential cyber attack. Al can also be used to detect and respond to threats in real-time, allowing for a faster response to cyber threats.

Ultimately, the impact of AI on cybersecurity will depend on how it is developed, deployed, and regulated. As with any technology, there are risks and benefits, and it is up to individuals and organizations to use AI responsibly to ensure the security of their data and systems.

Α

Model: Default (GPT-3.5)







THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2023



Exclusive Chicago Law Firm Hit With Security Incident

By Steven Lerner

A small Chicago-based law firm has been struck by a security incident involving possible unauthorized access to an email account, Law360 Pulse learned exclusively on Thursday.

Read full article » | Save to favorites »

Circle Back to Law Firms

| Connection Accepted |
|---------------------------------------|
| Connection Refused - Policy violation |
| Connection Accepted |
| Blocked - IP Spoofing |
| Blocked - IP Spoofing |
| Connection Refused - Policy violation |
| Connection Refused - Policy violation |
| Connection Accepted |
| Connection Accepted |
| Connection Accepted |
| Connection Accepted |
| |



Additional Resources

CISA (cisa.org)

NIST (nist.gov) 1.1 | 2.0

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8270-draft2.pdf

Introduction to Cybersecurity for Commercial Space Operations (2/22)



MUDD LAW

SPACE | INTERNET | CREATIVES | IP | STARTUPS

Questions and Comments

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